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ESSAYS
LOVE AND THE SOCRATIC METHOD
PETER M. CICCHINO∗
Early in the Nichomachean Ethics Aristotle offers a critical bit of
advice:
Our discussion will be adequate if it has as much clarity as the
subject matter admits; for precision is not to be sought for alike in
1
all discussions, any more than in all the products of the crafts.

It may seem odd to begin a reflection on the Socratic method and
its use in the classroom with a quote from Aristotle, arguably Plato’s
most renowned critic, but I think Aristotle’s admonition is very apt as
an introductory word of caution for all those who think about and
discuss issues of pedagogy.
This essay is about a certain tool of pedagogy, a certain method of
teaching, identified, for better or worse, as the “Socratic Method.”
Specifically, I’d like to offer some thoughts on the Socratic Method as
I understand it from the dialogues of Plato, and as I have applied it as
a teacher. These thoughts are entirely directed, however, to a
practical effect: improving our understanding of the Socratic method
so as to improve the experience of communication between those of
us who are in the position of teacher and those we call our students.
The argument of the essay is an elaboration on the title I have
chosen—Love and the Socratic Method—and has three major parts.
First, I will make the argument that for the purposes of

∗
Assistant Professor of Law at the American University, Washington College of Law
at the time of his death in July, 2000 at the age of 39. The author graduated from
Harvard Law School in June, 1992. This is an unfinished manuscript that formed the
basis of a talk given by the author to the faculty of the Washington College of Law on
October 13, 1998. Although the author outlined the entire paper, he did not have
the opportunity to complete it before his death.
1. ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS I:3 (1094b) (Jonathan Barnes trans.,
1985) [hereinafter NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS].
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contemporary teachers of law, the locus classicus of the Socratic
2
Method—Plato’s dialogue Meno —is singularly unhelpful, indeed,
almost guarantees pedagogical failure.
Instead, I will argue that teachers interested in the Socratic Method
should redirect their attention to what is, in my mind, the Platonic
dialogue that offers the most direct and unsettling challenge to those
who teach and study law: the Gorgias. In making that argument, I’ll
use the Gorgias to make explicit what I believe are the most important
elements of the Socratic Method and how those elements might be
3
applied in the contemporary law school classroom.
The
distinguishing mark those elements share, I will argue, is an
understanding of community, of a learning context of genuine
affection and concern, what I think can fairly be called “friendship”
or a kind of “civic love” among the interlocutors. In deriving those
elements from the Gorgias, I’ll also try to deal with obvious objections
to the guidelines I’ve discerned, not the least of which is the pervasive
irony with which Socrates often seems to treat his interlocutors.
Secondly, following upon the lessons of the Gorgias, I offer a
discussion of what I will term—somewhat idiosyncratically but, as I
hope will become apparent, helpfully—the erotics of the Socratic
Method and whether the eroticism of the method has a place in the
contemporary law school classroom.
Thirdly, I will offer some reflections on the concept of elenchus, the
method of interrogation and refutation that is at the heart of the
Socratic method. In developing this point, I will revisit one of the
most ancient controversies in Platonic studies: whether the elenchus

2. The dialogues of Plato often take their names from the most prominent (or
one of the prominent) interlocutors in the dialogue. Examples of the practice
within the Platonic corpus abound: e.g., Phaedo, Phaedrus, Theatetus, Cratylus, etc.
Hence, the Meno is a dialogue about a conversation with a Thesallian citizen named
Meno, the Gorgias features an encounter between Socrates and the great rhetorician
Gorgias of Leontini. In order to distinguish between references to the dialogue itself
and references to the characters that bear the dialogue’s name, this essay adopts the
convention of italicizing the names of dialogues, while leaving unitalicized the names
of characters. Another convention, used irregularly, is to place a definite article
before the name of the dialogue, while omitting it before the name of a person.
Attic Greek, however, frequently used definite articles before proper names, so that
the use of italicization seemed a better and more easily recognized method for
distinguishing between names of dialogues and names of characters.
3. While this Essay is addressed to those who teach law, and consistently refers
to teaching law students, I am convinced that the Socratic Method as described in
this essay has general educational applicability, and can be used to great effect with
high school students, college undergraduates, and forms of adult education other
than law school. Although I do not reflect on the experience here, among my most
successful experiences with the Socratic Method as described in this essay were as a
high school teacher of systematic theology, and as the teacher/facilitator of an adult
education course in which I guided ten senior citizens through Plato’s Republic.
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can bring only internal consistency, or can it arrive at truth? I use
that controversy to elaborate an alternative vision of the Socratic
Method.
The point of the argument is to defend a reconceived version of
the Socratic Method as not only an interesting and useful teaching
tool, but as perhaps the most appropriate and valuable form of
4
pedagogy for teaching law in a pluralistic democracy. My reading of
what constitutes the Socratic Method will, then, be in many ways
sharply different from its historical conception and conventional
practice in American law schools. Indeed, there is every chance that
my defense of the Socratic Method will sound rather like
Chesterton’s defense of Christianity: “It is not that [it] has been tried
and found wanting. It has been found difficult and not tried.”
Given that I teach as a law professor and am directing these
remarks to my colleagues in the legal academy, my primary focus is
on the contemporary law school classroom in the United States. To
be fair, though, to what I am about to relate, and to give a better
context for these remarks, I should say that the experimental
performances applying the Socratic Method from which these
reflections are drawn extend over fifteen years of teaching
experience in a wide variety of contexts.
Accordingly, before launching into my argument proper, I think
two preliminary sets of remarks are in order: the first a brief
autobiographical interlude; the second, harkening back to the words
of Aristotle with which I began, a note on method. I beg the reader’s
indulgence in this I hope not-too-egocentric digression not so as to
credential myself, but to provide a better understanding for the
experience—admittedly
personal
and
not
scientifically
representative, but still, I think potentially of broader use and
application—from which I write.
PRELUDE: REMARKS ON THE WRITER AND THE APPROACH
In the parochial elementary school I attended in the 1960s, it was a

4. In this article, as in many other aspects of my life and work, the writing of my
friend, Martha Nussbaum, has had an enormous effect on me. Throughout these
pages, my indebtedness to Martha Nussbaum’s work will be evident to anyone
familiar with her work on practical rationality in Aristotle, the role of the passions in
moral reasoning, and the value of the Socratic Method to contemporary education.
The works on which I rely most are LOVE’S KNOWLEDGE: ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHY AND
LITERATURE (particularly chapter 2, “The Discernment of Perception: An Aristotelian
Conception of Private and Public Rationality”) (Oxford Univ. Press 1990); THE
FRAGILITY OF GOODNESS ( Cambridge Univ. Press 1994) [hereinafter FRAGILITY OF
GOODNESS]; and CULTIVATING HUMANITY: A CLASSICAL DEFENSE OF REFORM IN LIBERAL
EDUCATION (Harvard Univ. Press 1997).
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regular practice to have students read aloud. One day, in October of
the 7th grade, when I was twelve years old, Sister Honora called upon
me to read from our religion textbook. In the midst of my reading,
she was suddenly summoned from the room. Not being told to stop,
I continued to read from the text to an uncharacteristically quiet and
attentive audience of my peers.
Sister Honora returned to the room about ten minutes later,
somewhat surprised to find me still reading and the class still
listening quietly. The next day, Sr. Honora called on me, again, to
read from the text. After about five minutes reading, a student raised
his hand and asked a question about the text. In a completely
unthinking, purely instinctive, and, given the practices of the time,
rather dangerous reaction, I simply answered the student’s question
without giving Sr. Honora a chance to speak.
After a look of surprise had passed from her countenance, Sr.
Honora smiled and said, “Yes, that’s correct.” On that day began a
process by which I came to teach my 7th grade class religion. Sr.
Honora progressed from having me read the entire period each day,
to having me answer questions, finally to departing the room entirely
and leaving me to teach my peers.
That experience—despite everything we all know about the
behavior of junior high school students—was really quite wonderful.
My peers were well behaved. I suffered no ostracism or resentment.
As incredible as it sounds, it was one of the happier experiences of
my time in Catholic school, and began a life-long love affair with
teaching.
Since that experience in Sr. Honora’s class, not a year has passed
without my being involved in some form of teaching: peer tutoring in
elementary and secondary school, Sunday school teaching as an
adolescent; a return to peer tutoring in college; then, as a Jesuit, a
variety of teaching assignments, including being a literacy instructor
at a homeless shelter, teaching three and four-year-olds at a
Montessori pre-school in inner-city Philadelphia, preparing a group
5
of women incarcerated for prostitution for their GED in a small
Berks County jail, teaching Attic Greek and Systematic Theology at a
boy’s private prep school in Washington, DC; then, after leaving the
Jesuits, teaching undergraduates at a local college, guiding a group of
senior citizens through Plato’s Republic, preparing eighth graders in
Harlem for the high school entrance exams of the Roman Catholic

5. “GED” is an abbreviation for “General Equivalency Diploma” or high school
equivalency degree.
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Archdiocese of New York, then teaching in the program on
Lawyering at the New York University School of Law. Finally, my
most recent experience with the Socratic Method has been teaching a
seminar in Jurisprudence as an assistant professor at American
University’s Washington College of Law.
That autobiographical excursion was meant to give some sense of
the contexts—the rather varied contexts—in which my experiences
in teaching are grounded and from which my reflections on the
Socratic Method emerge. The autobiography was also meant,
however, to illuminate the quotation from Aristotle with which I
began.
The point of the quotation from Aristotle on the appropriate
degree of precision to expect from a given area of inquiry was to
make clear that nothing this essay says has the empirical precision of
science or the compellingly deductive power of mathematics. That
should be obvious.
Nevertheless, years of experience being a teacher and talking about
teaching with other teachers has made me aware that there is a
persistent tendency to argue over teaching methods as if one were
arguing over the precise, replicable experiments of empirical science,
or debating the unchanging verities of geometry, rather than the
context-specific, highly personal, inextricably relational, and
therefore never perfectly repeatable performances of an art.
Moreover, although I am discussing a method of dialogic teaching
identified most closely with Plato’s Socrates and, as I noted earlier, in
a former life as a Jesuit taught high school boys introductory Attic
Greek, I have neither the expertise nor the intention to engage in
rigorous exegesis of the relevant Greek texts. Instead, what I intend
to do is most closely akin to talking about the practice of one’s art—
one’s own practice and the way in which one’s perception of a
master’s practice has influenced one’s art. This is, to employ another
metaphor, a kind of pedagogical midrash.
The art in question is teaching and—while it can be argued that all
art is relational, an experience between an artist, the artist’s creative
act, and the people who come into contact with that creative act—
teaching, especially as influenced by the form of the Socratic Method
I will defend, is arguably the most relational of arts. Its whole success
depends upon acknowledging, respecting, calling forth, and then
engaging the humanity of the persons involved in the work. In fact,
this sort of teaching upsets the simple schematic of the relational
nature of art I just offered—artist, creative act, experiencer of artist’s
act—because, as must be obvious, the creative act of the
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artist/teacher cannot happen either chronologically prior to or
conceptually distinct from interaction with the experiencer/student.
Like all good conversation, while some may know more and some
may know less, some may say more and some may say less, there are
only interlocutors—the dialogue comes into being only through the
speaking and listening of more than one person.
Having offered those methodological qualifications, I do not want
to convey the impression that I am exempting myself, or asking the
reader to exempt me, from reasonable standards of interpretive
fidelity and empirical accuracy. My hermeneutics, moral philosophy,
pedagogy, and way of being—as will become painfully clear—is
thoroughly unpostmodern. The sort of interpretation as word play,
pun, and free association that is so frustratingly a part of Derridian
performance art is not, I fear, part of my repertoire. Instead, I
proceed from the premise that while there is ambiguity and
indeterminacy in every text, as in all other aspects of human life, that
ambiguity and indeterminacy occur within often very well defined
limits. The empirical realities of human beings and the material
world, of history and science, the intentions of speakers to the degree
those intentions can be discerned and reconstructed, the logical
limits imposed by the grammar and vocabulary of a given text: all
those things serve to limit indeterminacy and, thereby, help
distinguish plausible, albeit sometimes improbable, interpretations
from sheer flights of fancy.
Accordingly, and it may be a measure of my madness that I dare
resort to such dichotomies, there is both a public and a personal
quality to every assertion made in this essay. What I call the public
quality of these remarks refers to those aspects of what I argue and
recommend that are accessible to and applicable by almost any
person: the texts I use, the logic by which I draw inferences, the
empirical assertions I make about contemporary law schools, their
students and faculty, and the general guidelines for implementing
the form of the Socratic Method I’ll propose.
What I call the personal quality of these reflections is not
necessarily accessible to or applicable by everyone. Precisely because
I believe teaching is an art—a very special kind of performance art—I
don’t believe that what works for one will work for all, or even many.
Again, to turn to Aristotle, in his discussion of humor in the
Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle seems to say that there are no definitive
and universal rules, no precise definition, of good joke telling “since
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different things are hateful or pleasant to different people.”
I’d submit that, like most arts, teaching has much the same quality
that Aristotle assigns to joke telling. There are generally applicable
observations, broad rules of thumb, but ultimately the activity is so
context specific that, as a good joke teller realizes, often, to use a
contemporary American expression, “You just had to be there.”
Material that would be hilarious in the hands of Eddie Murphy might
fall entirely flat when performed by Sandra Bernhart.
A similar observation might be made of the methods of teaching.
While every classroom should share certain features—e.g., adequate
resources in terms of textbooks and educational materials; respect for
students independent of race, creed, gender, age, sexual orientation,
ethnicity, disability, etc.—what “works” as effective teaching is highly
context dependent. In fact, so dependent is effective teaching on the
unique histories and circumstances of the people involved in the
enterprise that it is unhelpful to seek highly specific, universal rules
to follow in order to be effective teachers or design effective
curricula.
None of these preliminary observations on method is meant to
foreclose criticism or preempt objections through an easy-going
relativism—e.g., ‘Different strokes for different folks.”
These
comments on method are, however, intended to head off criticism
that is rooted in either or both of the following rarely articulated, but
widely acted upon misconceptions: (1) that because one cannot
imagine oneself using a proposed teaching method, that method must
be wrongheaded; or, and the second misconception is closely related
to the first, (2) because one cannot envision a teaching method being
effectively universalized to every classroom, that method therefore
ought not to be used in any classroom.
With those preliminary remarks on perspective and method, let me
turn to the substantive argument at hand.
I.

RECONCEIVING THE SOCRATIC METHOD: THE LOCUS CLASSICUS
AND ITS ALTERNATIVES

The textual place—often the only place—to which every discussion
of the Socratic Method in legal pedagogy seems to turn is the
Platonic dialogue Meno, in which Socrates demonstrates the method

6. NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS (1128a 25ff). I am indebted to Martha Nussbaum for
this illustration. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LOVE’S KNOWLEDGE: ESSAYS ON
PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE 71 (1990) (discussing Aristotle’s concept of practical
rationality).
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7

by questioning a slave boy. The most recent example of this turn to
the Meno of which I am aware is an article by Peggy Cooper Davis and
Elizabeth Ehrenfest Steinglass in New York University School of Law’s
Review of Law & Social Change in an article entitled “A Dialogue About
8
the Socratic Method.”
From the start, let me be clear that I have no intention of using
Cooper-Davis and Ehrenfest-Steinglass as a foil. Their article is
thoughtful and provocative, reasonable and well-written, a
remarkable combination of empirical research and textual analysis,
and, if that were not enough, includes a very amusing parody of a
Platonic dialogue.
Where I will differ from Cooper-Davis and Ehrenfest-Steinglass is:
(1) in my focus on the Gorgias rather than on the Meno as the most
useful source for finding a model of the Socratic Method for law
school teaching; and (2) the account of the Socratic Method I will
generate based upon the different textual focus I have chosen.
First, however, something should be said about the dialogues—
Meno and Gorgias.
A. The Platonic Dialogues—Meno & Gorgias
In the Prolegomena in Platonis Philosophorum, an ancient anonymous
author explains that:
Plato adopted the dialogue form because it imitates dialectic. For
just as dialectic proceeds by question and answer, so the dialogue is
composed of characters questioning and answering. In order,
then, that, just as dialectic compels the soul to reveal the labors it
undergoes (for according to Plato the soul is like a writing tablet
with nothing written on it), so also the dialogue may compel the
9
reader to assent to the things being said.

The canon of the Platonic dialogues consists of twenty-seven
philosophical works written in dialogue form in the Greek city-state
of Athens in the fifth century B.C.E. While a precise chronological
ordering of the dialogues is impossible, the dialogues are often

7. See, e.g., Peggy Cooper Davis & Elizabeth Ehrenfest Steinglass, A Dialogue
About the Socratic Method, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 249 (1997) [hereinafter
Davis & Steinglass] (discussed at length infra); Thomas D. Eisele, The Poverty of
Socratic Questioning: Asking and Answering in the Meno, U. CIN. L. REV. 221, 232 (1994)
(relying on Meno as illustration of Socratic Method of questioning); Richard K.
Neumann, Jr., A Preliminary Inquiry Into the Art of Critique, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 725, 730
(1989) (using Meno as paradigmatic Socratic dialogue); John W. Cooley, A Classical
Approach to Mediation: Part II: The Socratic Method and Conflict Refraiming in Mediation,
19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 589, 596 (1994) (using Meno to illustrate Socratic Method as
inducing recollection).
8. Davis & Steinglass, supra note 7.
9. Quoted in Terence Irwin, PLATO’S ETHICS 7 (Oxford Univ. Press 1995).
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grouped into three chronological periods—early, middle, late—
10
Generally,
which have attendant philosophical pre-occupations.
both Meno and Gorgias are placed among the early or early-middle
dialogues. The significance of the chronological grouping to which a
dialogue belongs is manifold: as Plato progressed in his writing of
dialogues, a number of changes occurred. For the purposes of this
discussion, the two most important of those changes are: (1) the
depiction of the character of Socrates in the Platonic dialogues seems
to stray further and further from what are believed to have been the
philosophical views of the historical Socrates; and (2) the dramatic
form of Plato’s dialogues loses some of its vitality, e.g., the dialogue
form becomes more purely formalistic, with most interlocutors
serving as no more than “yes” men, and Socrates as a dramatic
character is eventually eclipsed by the Athenian stranger, such that in
Plato’s later dialogues, the Sophist, Statesman, and Timaeus, Socrates is
present but plays no significant part in the dialogue, and is entirely
absent from what is almost universally regarded as Plato’s last
11
dialogue, Laws.
Both the Meno and the Gorgias, being relatively early dialogues,
feature Socrates prominently as a dramatic character and make a
more than purely formalistic use of the dialogue format. The Meno
follows the Gorgias chronologically, and shows signs of the
development of Plato’s thought away from the singular moral
preoccupations associated with the historical Socrates. Specifically,
the Meno is concerned with epistemological and related metaphysical
issues in a way that the Gorgias is not. Following Gregory Vlastos, I
treat the Meno as not being an elenctic dialogue, while the Gorgias
12
clearly is. By that, I mean that Meno does not seriously employ the

10. For examples of such grouping by two prominent Platonists, one from the
preceding generation, the other from the ranks of contemporary Platonic
philosophers, see, e.g., Gregory Vlastos, “Socrates ‘contra’ Socrates in Plato’, in SOCRATES:
IRONIST AND MORAL PHILOSOPHER 46-47 (1991); Terence Irwin, PLATO’S ETHICS 11
(1995). Vlastos and Irwin have different purposes in their discussion of the ordering
of the dialogues in the works cited above. The point, however, is to illustrate the
widespread agreement on the general groupings of the dialogues as “early,”
“middle,” and “late.”
11. See EDITH HAMILTON & HUNTINGTON CAIRNS, THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF
PLATO 1225 (1971).
12. See Vlastos, supra note 10, at 46-49. While I do not track the ten differences
Vlastos discerns between Plato’s early elenctic dialogues and non-elenctic dialogues
of the middle period, a number of the differences Vlastos identifies help illuminate
the argument of those essays.
Among those differences are: (1) Socrates in the
E
elenctic dialogues (Socrates ) is exclusively a moral
philosopher while the Socrates of
M
the middle, non-elenctic dialogues
(Socrates ) is concerned with a whole range of
E
philosophical issues; (2) Socrates M does not hold to a theory of separately existing
E
universals (forms), while Socrates does propound such a theory;
(3) Socrates has
M
an egalitarian and populist view of philosophy, Socrates has an elitist view;
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method of questioning known as the elenchus that seems to have been
a hallmark of the philosophical method of the historical Socrates.
The dialogue of the Gorgias, as will be further elaborated, is, by
contrast, an extended exhibition of the elenctic method.
Beyond those differences, for the purpose of this essay, the most
important difference between the dialogues is the method of
dialogue that Socrates pursues. Before identifying that difference,
however, a brief summary of each dialogue seems in order.
The setting of the Meno is a conversation between the Athenian,
Socrates, and a citizen of Thessaly named Meno. The dialogue opens
with Meno posing the question, “Can you tell me, Socrates, is virtue
13
something that can be taught?” (70b) From which Socrates turns to
the more fundamental, and quintessentially Socratic, question: “What
is virtue itself?” (71b-d). Meno, however, is justifiably perplexed by
how Socrates can answer that question if he disclaims any knowledge
of what virtue is. (80d). It is in response to Meno’s question that
Socrates conducts his famous examination of the slave boy. (82b85b).
The details of that examination need not pre-occupy this
discussion. In their article, Cooper-Davis and Ehrenfest-Steinglass
14
provide an excellent summary. Suffice it to say that merely by asking
questions, Socrates guides the slave boy to a correct understanding of
a rudimentary problem in geometry. For the purposes of this
discussion, the points to emphasize about the Meno are four.
First, the primary purpose of the exhibition of the method is not to
arrive at some substantive point—e.g., a better understanding of
some virtue or virtue itself—but to illustrate an important aspect of
Platonic epistemology, i.e., the theory of anemnesis or remembering, a
theory which implies a particular metaphysics. In its most summary
form, that theory postulates that prior to our present lives, each of us
15
existed as a disembodied soul.
During that period of

E

(4) Socrates has no elaborate
theory and, while critical of democracy, is not openly
M
hostile to it, while Socrates possesses an elaborated political theory expressly hostile
to democracy;
(5) homoerotic
desire and attachments, while playing Ma role for both
E
M
Socrates and Socrates , are evacuated of physical Edesire in Socrates and provided
an intellectual, metaphysical basis; and (6) Socrates uses a method
that relies almost
M
entirely on refuting the views of his interlocutors, Socrates has a positive doctrine
that he teaches to his listeners.
13. Throughout, I refer to textual numbers used in all scholarly editions of Plato,
independent of translation. For the reader’s convenience, I have departed from
standard law review citation and placed textual references to Platonic dialogues in
parentheses after the sentence or sentences requiring citation.
14. See Davis & Steinglass, supra note 7, at 255-59.
15. This account of the theory of anamnesis can be garnered from the dialogues.
For a brief general description of the theory see FRANCIS M. CORNFORD, BEFORE AND
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disembodiment, we experienced directly a world of independently
existing universals known as the eidoi or the forms. Matter, for Plato,
being something of an errant cause, incarnation therefore brings
with it a loss of our prior knowledge—that clear vision of the forms—
and requires a process by which we “remember” that which we forgot.
In the example of the Meno, Socrates’ questioning of the slave boy
causes the boy to “remember” what he already knew: i.e., the
universal and necessary truths of mathematics, in this case, Euclidean
geometry.
Second, there is a radical power imbalance between the immediate
subject of Socrates’ demonstration of the method of anemnesis or
remembering—the slave boy—and the person demonstrating the
16
method—Socrates.
Third, the slave boy is purely instrumental to Socrates’
demonstration of a larger point. There is, then, no sense of the
importance of the dialogue to the lives of the interlocutors, nor of
the importance of the interlocutors to one another. The unnamed
slave boy—at arguably the lowest rung of the Athenian social
ladder—is a mere means by which Socrates makes a point to Meno,
and the subject matter of the interrogation is irrelevant to the moral
17
investigation that Socrates is conducting with Meno.
Fourth, the slave boy is a purely passive agent—he is “acted upon”
and suffers or undergoes the method without questioning Socrates or
engaging actively in dialogue himself.
The dramatic and philosophical pre-occupations of the Gorgias are
significantly different. More than any other Platonic dialogue, the
Gorgias is relevant to those who teach and practice law.
The dramatic setting of the Gorgias has Socrates visiting a house
where one of the greatest rhetoricians of the ancient world, Gorgias
of Leontini, is holding forth. It is important to recognize that, in
effect, Socrates is visiting the equivalent of a law school of his day.
The Athenians were notoriously litigious, as the conservative satirist
Aristophanes made hilariously clear in comedies such as The
18
Clouds. There were, however, no formal professions of lawyer or
judge. Accordingly, citizens argued their cases themselves, with juries

AFTER SOCRATES 70-75 (1932). Cornford uses the term “reminiscence” to describe
Plato’s theory of remembering.
16. See DAVID M. HALPERIN, ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF GREEK HOMOSEXUALITY: AND
OTHER ESSAYS ON GREEK LOVE (1989).
17. Subject matter of investigation is not an issue of mutual concern—justice or
virtue.
18. See ARISTOPHANES, CLOUDS (Alan H. Sommerstein ed., Humanities Press
1982).
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of varying sizes being chosen by lot. Nor were the roles of plaintiff
and defendant, prosecutor and defense attorney well defined.
Generally, if a party lost a verdict, as Socrates does in his trial in the
Apology, the losing party would propose some punishment and have
an opportunity to persuade the jury to impose that punishment. The
party prevailing in the verdict, however, would also have the
opportunity to persuade the jury to impose the penalty of his choice.
Given such a situation, the ability to persuade your fellow citizens
was enormously important and potentially lucrative. Thus sprung up
schools of rhetoric, headed by men known as Sophists, who could,
according to Gorgias, answer any question on any subject (447c) and
persuade people to do whatever the rhetorician wanted, even better
than the advice of a genuine expert could persuade. (456b). Thus
Gorgias boasts that he has succeeded in persuading patients to take a
treatment when the entreaties and arguments of a genuine medical
expert—a doctor—had failed. (456c).
Such skill was enormously important to Athenians, and wealthy
families paid large fees to have their sons trained in such skill. To
appreciate fully the importance of such skill, one has to understand
the nature of Athenian democracy.
The vast majority of human beings in Athens—women, slaves,
resident aliens—were completely disenfranchised. Yet for a select
few—the free, adult, male citizens—there existed an extraordinary
degree of democratic self-determination. The chief institution of
decision making was “a mass-meeting of all the native male
19
residents” called the Assembly. Every adult male citizen was part of
the Assembly. As one renowned classicist described it: “Any citizen
could speak—if he could get the Assembly to listen; anybody could
20
propose anything, within certain strict constitutional safeguards.”
The practical needs of carrying out decisions for the Assembly
dictated the creation of smaller political bodies, essentially
committees of the Assembly. The Boule or Council of the Five
Hundred was one such body, chosen by lot, fifty men from each of
the ten tribes or demes of Athens. The composition of the Council,
however, was not consistent, being essentially chosen at random. The
Council, in turn, had an executive committee or prytany composed of
fifty men, five from each deme. The prytany remained in session for
one-tenth of each year, with a chairman chosen by lot each day.

19. H.D.F. KITTO, THE GREEKS 126 (1951). The discussion of Athenian
democracy contained in this article relies on Kitto’s treatment of the subject.
20. Id.
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Socrates, himself, once held the chairmanship of the prytany.
The democratic quality of political life for free male citizens in
Athens was further heightened by the lack of professionalism in the
making of legislation and the administration of justice. Even the
office of strategos or general/admiral was an annually elected one. It
was, therefore, “no unusual thing for an Athenian to be a general in
22
one campaign and a private soldier in the next.” As the classicist
H.D.F. Kitto summarizes the implicit theory undergirding Athenian
democracy:
Beneath this general aversion to the professional there was a more
or less conscious theory of the polis: namely, that the duty of taking
part, at the appropriate season of life, in all the affairs of the polis
was one that the individual owed both to the polis and to himself.
It was part of that full life which only the polis could provide: the
savage, living for himself alone, could not have it, nor the civilized
“barbarian” living in a vast empire ruled by a King and his personal
servants. To the Athenian at least, self-rule by discussion, selfdiscipline, personal responsibility, direct participation in the life of
23
the polis at all points—these things were the breath of life.

As a final observation, Kitto’s comment about the “appropriate
season of life” should not be ignored. While I have not mentioned
them here, the other critically important group in Athenian
democracy was the citizens in training, i.e., the free male boys and
adolescents who would one day take their place in the Assembly and
whose education was, therefore, so critically important. It is no
accident that Plato takes the education of the young as a central
concern of his ideal polis in the Republic or that, in the Apology,
neither Socrates nor his accusers questions the validity of treating the
corruption of the young as a capital offense.
In many ways—and not entirely for the purpose of sarcastic
analogy—Athenian democracy resembled the governance of a
contemporary law school: i.e., most people (staff, adjuncts, students)
are pretty much completely disenfranchised from real governance of
the community; a relatively small number of people (the tenured
faculty) having an extraordinary degree of democratic self-rule in
guiding, or at least having the opportunity to guide, the community;
and a smaller group of people (the untenured, but tenure-track
faculty) are valued, but also continually evaluated, as future members
of the governing class.

21. Id. at 126-27.
22. Id. at 127.
23. Id. at 128.

CICCHINOSOCRATICJCI.DOC

546

7/10/2001 11:19 AM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:533

The relevance of the nature of Athenian democracy will become
clearer in our subsequent discussion of the Socratic Method. For
now, the point to take from all of this is that Socrates is not walking
in, in the Gorgias, on just any group of tradesmen. The schools of
rhetoric had a profound effect on the formation of the “best and the
brightest” young people in Athenian society. Moreover, if their
promises to teach the persuasive arts held even a modicum of truth,
the schools of rhetoric offered a power that could have a profound
and potentially disastrous effect on Athenian society.
Thus when Socrates confronts the rhetoricians, it is no mere
argumentative game. He is in it, quite literally, for his life, the lives of
his fellow citizens, and the life of the city.
In the Gorgias, Socrates poses an explicit and an implicit challenge.
The explicit challenge to the rhetoricians is to provide a definition of
the art of rhetoric: i.e., is rhetoric an art and, if so, what is its subject
matter? (449d). The implicit challenge of Socrates, the challenge
that speaks most directly to those who teach and study law, is whether
the teacher of rhetoric imparts a skill or power to the student without
regard for how that student might use that skill or power. (455d). As
Socrates puts it to Gorgias: “What will attending your courses hold
for us? What will we be able to advise Athens on?” (455d).
The response of Gorgias—despite his profession and for all his
faults, a basically decent person—is that while rhetoric has the power
to persuade people to do just about anything, “[j]ust like any other
competitive skill, rhetoric should be used when morally appropriate.”
(457b). But Gorgias adds,
If a person becomes good at rhetoric and then uses the power this
expertise brings to do wrong, surely people shouldn’t bear a
grudge against the teacher and ban him from their communities.
The teacher passed his expertise on for moral usage, and it’s this
pupil of his who’s using it for the opposite reasons.

(457b).
To his credit, the moral sensibilities of Gorgias, however, turn out
to be too sensitive for Socrates’ examination, and Gorgias quickly
concedes that a rhetorician will never deliberately do wrong. (460c).
This, however, is too much for two of Gorgias’ disciples, and soon
Socrates must face, respectively, Polus and Callicles.
Polus may be seen as a second generation rhetorician, lacking both
Gorgias’s talent and the internal constraints that come with Gorgias’s
basic decency. Nevertheless, Polus is sufficiently committed (or wants
to appear committed) to virtue that Socrates soon has him granting
that no one does evil voluntarily (468d) and that to suffer an injustice
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is better than to commit an injustice against another. (475d).
This last admission proves the breaking point for Callicles, the
youngest and most aggressive of Socrates’ interlocutors in the Gorgias,
and the person with whom Socrates will converse at greatest length.
Callicles is someone whom most of us have met either on the
faculty or among our classmates in law school: a child of privilege,
possessed by a feeling of entitlement, having cleverness and
eloquence without wisdom or compassion, a 5th century B.C.E.
Neitzschean who defends the idea that justice is nothing other than
the rule of the strong, and morality is just the rules of the weak.
(483b-d). In so many ways, Socrates’ encounter with Callicles
foreshadows Socrates’ argument with Thrasymachus in the first book
24
of the Republic.
It is not my purpose to engage the substance of Socrates’ extended
argument with Callicles here. Rather, I want to draw out, in express
contrast to the Meno, the rules of dialogue that Socrates both makes
explicit and demonstrates implicitly through the dialogue.
First, in order to carry on dialectical conversation effectively, one
must have three qualities: knowledge, affection, and candor. As
Socrates explains to Callicles:
I come across a lot of people, you see, who can’t test me because
they don’t have your knowledge, and then there’s another lot who
are knowledgeable enough, but refuse to tell me the truth because
they don’t care for me as you do. Then there are our two visitors
here, Gorgias and Polus, who have the knowledge and are fond of
me, but are too easily embarrassed to speak their minds. (487a-b).

Second, related to the first, we do not take positions we do not
sincerely hold. In other words, we say what we mean and mean what
we say. (481b). Chaerephon notes that Socrates is “entirely serious”
about what he is saying (495a); and, at one point in the dialogue,
Socrates chastises Callicles for breaking his promise of candor (495a).
Third, the interlocutor is treated as an end-in-himself. Gaining the
interlocutor’s assent is the central goal, not demonstrating one’s
knowledge, much less displaying intellectual superiority. (515b-c, in
which Socrates recognizes the importance of Callicles, that someday
Callicles may be a statesman).
Fourth, the interlocutors must commit themselves to a certain kind
of humility, i.e., a willingness to have their views examined and to
surrender a position when that position has been shown to lead to
conclusions that their proponent finds humanly unacceptable. This

24. REPUBLIC, BOOK I.

CICCHINOSOCRATICJCI.DOC

548

7/10/2001 11:19 AM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:533

principle embodies an idea expressed in the Republic, “wherever the
argument, like a wind, tends, thither we must go” (394d), but also
includes a commitment of mutual respect and a firm choice against
both insult and ad hominem:
What happens when two people are arguing about something is
that one person tells the other he’s wrong or has expressed himself
obscurely, and then they get angry and each thinks that his own
point of view is being maliciously misinterpreted by the other
person, and they start trying to win the argument, rather than look
into the issue they set out to discuss. (457d)

Accordingly, I infer a fifth principle: the purpose of dialectical
argument is to try to arrive at truth or knowledge, or at least the
knowledge that we do not know (aporia), not to display our superior
oratorical or intellectual ability, or to establish dominance in any way.
Sixth, there are no persons, ideas, or institutions so sacred that
they cannot be subjected to critical scrutiny. Everything must be
examined critically, even our most cherished beliefs, our most
respected institutions, our most revered heroes. The manner in
which Socrates treats some of the most eminent statesman of
Athenian history—Pericles, Cimon, Themistocles, Miltiades (515c517a)—is an apt illustration of this point. For Socrates to conclude,
in his review of Athenian political history with Callicles, that “as far as
we can tell, there’s never been a single good statesman in Athens”
would strike his contemporary listeners as no less disrespectful and
outrageous than a law professor who announced that, after careful
examination of that group of white, bourgeois, frequently slaveowning men we call the founding fathers, “There wasn’t a single true
statesman among them.”
Seventh, while all views are subjected to the critical scrutiny of
reason, precisely because of the importance of our conversation and
the fact that we mean what we say, it is appropriate to speak with
passion. Interestingly, Socrates, who is notorious for the derogation
25
of the passions, at least in the early dialogues, makes no denial or
objection when Callicles notes that Socrates has spoken “with all that
passion” (482c), after Socrates pleads with Callicles to take their
conversation seriously, and answer the questions Socrates puts to
him.
Eighth, the participants in the Socratic Method are just that—
participants. While Socrates does most of the questioning, he is open
to being questioned himself and, at least in principle, that role

25. See, e.g., FRAGILITY
Phaedrus).

OF

GOODNESS, supra note 4 (chapters on Symposium and
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reversal may happen at any time. Moreover, the person being
questioned gives permission to be questioned, i.e., the subject of
questioning in the Socratic Method gives his (or her) free consent to
be questioned.
Ninth and lastly, the focus of the conversation ultimately turns on
matters of justice—it is pre-occupied with the questions: In what does
the best human life consist and how do we go about living such a life?
B. An Objection, An Application, and More Objections
The first objection to the characterization of the Socratic Method I
have gleaned from the Gorgias is that some or even most of what I
have garnered is offered by Socrates in jest or, at a minimum, with a
strong dose of irony. “Irony” here is not used in the technical sense
in Platonic studies, i.e., referring to Socrates’ presumably insincere
profession of ignorance, but in its contemporary, idiomatic sense.
Aren’t many of Socrates’ seemingly most humane protestations in the
Gorgias, e.g., his insistence on sincerely wanting to convince Callicles,
his call for affection and candor, his renunciation of ad hominem
and profession of respect for his interlocutors, just a form of mild
teasing, a species of disrespect, however gently expressed?
Those questions are more appropriate to a journal of classical
studies. Suffice it to say that they cannot be answered adequately
here. Nevertheless, I would invite a careful inspection of the Gorgias
itself. I am convinced that what I have taken to be the explicit and
implicit rules of argument are a fair representation of what the
character of Socrates in the Gorgias actually holds. Indeed, without
taking seriously the rules I have garnered, the dramatic flow of the
dialogue, particularly the moving and impassioned mythic plea that
Socrates makes at the end of the dialogue, would make no sense.
Of more concern to me here is the application of the rules I have
garnered. Let me illustrate how those rules might be applied in a law
school classroom, partly by way of contrast with what I take to be the
historical practice of the Socratic Method.
As I understand it, from personal experience, from anecdote, and
from pedagogical literature, the Socratic Method as traditionally
applied in American law school classrooms more resembles the
method of interrogation in the Meno than the argument in the
Gorgias.
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OUTLINE OF REMAINDER
Explain how the method outlined from Gorgias can be
applied in the contemporary law school classroom. Note
contrast with traditional (Meno) form of method.
Consider Objections:
a. Irremediable nature of power imbalance (GRADING!)
b. Problem of “Insincere” Questions
c. Cultural Alienation & the Difficulty of Creating
Community
d. Intrusiveness, Invasion of Privacy—what if someone
doesn’t want to be part of inquiring community?
e. Requirement of Knowledge—accommodating didactic
elements into method (psychogogia)
f. Focus on Justice—what about technical matter (the
method may be OK for Jurisprudence or
Constitutional Law, but how do I apply this to my tax
class?)
g. Self-Esteem and Classroom Terror—dealing with
contemporary students whose anxiety at the use of the
Method may impair their ability to engage in the
Method.
The Erotics of the Method
A. Foucault and Halperin: the (homo)erotics of the
Socratic dialogues
B. Penetrating and Being Penetrated—Who Examines
(Questions) and Who Gets Examined (Questioned)
C. The Athenian Analogy—mentoring, gaining approval
Elenchus—the Method of Refutation
A. Explaining the Elenchus
B. Elenchus and Psychogogia
C. Whether the Elenchus can bring us to Truth
(Knowledge)?
D. Myths of Judgment and the Affirmative Doctrine of
Socrates
Conclusion

